

WHITE PAPER

FIREWALL CLEANUP RECOMMENDATIONS
CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVED
FIREWALL EFFICIENCY, BETTER SECURITY,
AND REDUCED POLICY COMPLEXITY



Table of Contents

Executive Summary	3
The Problem with Firewall Administration	3
Causes of Firewall Policy Mistakes	3
▪ Policy Complexity.....	3
▪ Excessive Access.....	4
▪ Ineffective Change Management.....	4
▪ Poor Definition of Business Requirements.....	4
▪ Lack of “Aging” Strategy.....	4
Firewall Policy Cleanup Process.....	5
▪ Remove Technical Mistakes.....	5
▪ Remove Unused Access.....	6
▪ Review Rules and Refine Access.....	7
Benefits of a Proper Firewall Policy.....	7
FireMon Security Manager - the Right Tool for the Job.....	8
Remove Technical Mistakes with Hidden-Rules Report.....	8
Remove Unused Access with Usage Analysis.....	9
▪ Rule Usage Analysis.....	9
▪ Unused Rule Analysis.....	9
▪ Unused Object Analysis.....	9
Review Rules and Refine Access.....	10
▪ Overly Permissive Rules and Use of “ANY”	10
▪ A Word about Rule Documentation.....	10
▪ Audit Change Log.....	11
Additional Recommended Reading	11



Executive Summary

Firewalls are designed to provide access control. Although there is risk associated with any access, by limiting what access is permitted the risk is limited and understood and can be evaluated against business need to effectively justify the risk. However, poor firewall management defeats this purpose by ineffectively controlling access and limiting visibility into what access is actually permitted; poor management also increases the cost associated with security management.

The result of poor management is a firewall policy with unnecessary rules that result in excessive complexity, overly permissive access, unnecessary risk and performance degradation, all of which lead to higher costs that can be avoided. These problems can be addressed with both short-term and long-term activities to clean up the firewall now and prevent this situation from returning. This paper discusses the implications of firewall policy complexity, why it remains a problem today and how to resolve it.

The Problem with Firewall Administration

Firewalls are designed and implemented to control access, whether that access is inbound or outbound, restricted as to source or destination, or a limitation on available services. At the core of the firewall is the policy, made up of rules, that enforces what access is permitted. Nearly all firewalls are designed with a “positive security model,” meaning that unless a rule expressly permits access, that access is denied. This design should limit access only to what is necessary, but in practice, firewall management is very complicated, and significantly more access is permitted than is necessary. Traditional firewall administration typically results in mistakes, unnecessary complexity, excessive access and substantial risk.

Managing firewalls configured with thousands of rules places a considerable burden on organizations to make sure that their firewall policies are implemented correctly. Large organizations have deployed hundreds of firewalls to control access, and the configurations of these devices are constantly changing. Firewall policies quickly become complex as the number of rules and objects grows from hundreds to thousands. In addition, organizations often have a mix of firewall vendors and different administrators for different business units within the organization. Too often organizations are faced with poor-quality policies and unused rules, resulting in misconfiguration of network and security systems, errors, downtime, poor device performance, reduced security and increased risk.

This is a severe problem that affects nearly every enterprise. A recent survey of hundreds of enterprises discovered that 73 percent of all respondents considered their firewall policies ranged from “somewhat complex” to “out of control.”

The impact of these issues is even worse. The firewalls that should provide confidence by exposing only an accepted amount of access and related risk have become so difficult to manage that most administrators accept that security gaps exist in the firewall policy due to complexity and lack of visibility.

Causes of Firewall Policy Mistakes

The scope and severity of improperly configured firewalls necessitates action. To understand what must be done, it is first important to understand how the problem is created. There are two primary issues that necessitate policy cleanup: complexity and excessive access.

POLICY COMPLEXITY

Complexity by itself is not a security issue. In large complex enterprises, the firewalls that control access will necessarily have complex firewall policies. However, excessive complexity has implications that are a problem. Not

surprisingly, there is a strong correlation between the complexity of the firewall and the number of mistakes in the policy. As complexity increases, mistakes increase. Unfortunately, each mistake adds unnecessary complexity, resulting in even further mistakes. Over the years, these problems compound upon one another, resulting in an unmanageable policy, deteriorated firewall performance, increased risk and increased management costs.

The effort required to manage a firewall significantly increases as the complexity of a policy increases. The cost to correctly administer the firewall increases exponentially as well. Increased costs are associated with creating new rules due to the time it takes to identify where and how to meet the change requirement. Management costs are also associated with annual audits of these exceedingly complex policies.

Beyond the management costs, there are also system costs to complexity. The larger a security policy, the more taxing it is for the firewall to evaluate new access attempts against the policy. In one extreme example, average CPU usage of a firewall was reduced by 30 percent when the unused rules were removed from the policy.

EXCESSIVE ACCESS

Excessive access, on the other hand, is a problem in its own right. By definition, excessive access violates the purpose of the firewall, which is to control access. However, it is extremely common and most often unintentional. There are three primary causes for this issue:

- Ineffective change management
- Poor definition of business requirements
- Lack of strategy to address rule “aging”

INEFFECTIVE CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Unnecessary changes are made in several ways. Some are made without considering how best to implement them based on the current policy. Changes are made without considering the potential risk to the business. In worst-case scenarios, rogue changes are made that compromise all security.

POOR DEFINITION OF BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS

Business is demanding. Changes are requested and must be implemented quickly. Often, these requests provide limited information about what is necessary to permit access. A simple request such as “permit access to this server from my network” does not provide sufficient information to limit access to only necessary access. What part of the network truly needs the access? What services are needed to permit necessary access? The result is often the creation of broad access rules. Well-intentioned security administrators will do their best to limit access, but without good information, it is very difficult. Often rules are created with “ANY” objects to enable the access in a timely fashion to meet the business demand.

LACK OF “AGING” STRATEGY

There is an old riddle about firewall management: What goes in but never comes out? Answer: A firewall rule! Most organizations have well-established methods and procedures for adding rules into a firewall, but very few organizations have strategies for removing rules that no longer serve a legitimate business purpose. In fact, 63 percent of the respondents in a recent survey identified unused rules as a primary cause of policy complexity, while 59 percent cited the lack of vendor-supplied tools to assist in policy analysis as preventing them from addressing the problem. Over time, unnecessary rules result in excessive complexity, overly permissive access, unnecessary risk and performance degradation, all of which lead to higher costs that can be avoided.

Consider this scenario: the IT team decommissions an old database server that was recently replaced but neglects to inform the firewall administration team that access to the old server is no longer required. Sixty days later, the same IT team reuses the IP address of the old server for another resource. The result is a rule in the firewall allowing access to an unintended resource!

Another scenario that is too often repeated revolves around unused rules that are identified, yet the original business owner who requested the rule is no longer at the company. No one wants to assume responsibility for disabling or removing the now-stagnant rule — of which they have zero knowledge — for fear it might be needed later or removal may have an impact on service. This situation is further compounded by missing or poorly organized centralized rule documentation that could be referenced to help track the original rule's business justification, rule owners, responsible departments and more.

However, effective firewall management can overcome these issues, clean up the unnecessary complexity that currently exists, and ensure firewalls continue to control access based on business need.

Firewall Policy Cleanup Process

Maintaining an effective, efficient and correct firewall policy is a continual process. But in most cases, the existing firewall infrastructure is in dire need of an initial cleanup to address years of abuse and neglect. This section addresses this one-time or potentially periodic process of firewall cleanup. However, a more effective firewall management strategy should be considered to prevent the recurrence of this problem. This topic is briefly addressed at the end of this paper.

There are two key items to consider when cleaning up a firewall:

- **Time / Effort / Cost:** These are all essentially different measurements of the same issue. With limited time and resources to perform daily responsibilities, care and concern must be paid to how to reduce the effort necessary to achieve the goal of cleaning up the firewall policy. An efficient process must be followed to reduce this effort as much as possible.
- **Business Impact / Risk:** Over 80 percent of all network outages are caused by change. Firewall change is particularly risky and has the potential to both open a network up to excessive risk and negatively impact business continuity. Any changes made to the policy must take into consideration the risk of the change and the impact to the business.

The process outlined below takes these items into account by laying out a process that first attacks the quickest and least risky changes to immediately reduce complexity, then follows up with low-risk, high-value changes, and finally addresses the more time-consuming but high-value changes. This process most efficiently addresses the complexity and accuracy issues of a firewall policy.

REMOVE TECHNICAL MISTAKES

Technical mistakes in a firewall policy can be identified as ineffective or incorrect no matter what the firewall is protecting. Two primary examples of technical mistakes are redundant and shadowed hidden rules. These two mistakes are very similar in that they are both examples of rules (or portions of rules) that the firewall will never evaluate because a prior rule will match the incoming traffic. The difference between the two is that a redundant rule has the same action as the rule that hides it, and a shadowed rule has an opposite action.

The reason for making this distinction is that shadowed rules present a second problem beyond unnecessary complexity; they also can cause significant confusion. An administrator analyzing a policy may see the shadowed rule and make an incorrect assumption about the firewall's behavior on the matching traffic. For this reason, shadowed rules are seen as a more severe issue in a firewall policy. Hidden rules are a very good example of unnecessary complexity. The rules serve no business function.

Removing these hidden rules is a very low-risk change, since after removal there is no change in firewall behavior. Hidden rules, by definition, were never going to be evaluated by the firewall, so removing them will have no effect on the policy behavior.

However, identifying hidden rules is not a trivial task. Manual evaluation of a policy to find hidden rules is very difficult. In a small policy of tens of rules, it may be possible to spot these mistakes, but in a policy with hundreds, or even thousands, of rules, this is a very difficult task. Beyond just policy size, individual rule complexity caused by multiple objects, nested groups and poor naming conventions can all lead to difficulty in identifying hidden rules. Although removing a hidden rule is considered low risk, this assumes that the hidden rules are correctly identified. For accurate and complete identification of hidden rules, use of an automated analysis is suggested. The sheer size and complexity of a typical enterprise firewall makes this step in the process too difficult to perform manually.

REMOVE UNUSED ACCESS

Unused but permitted access causes both excessive complexity and unnecessary risk. Any access through a firewall introduces some risk to the organization; however permitted access that is not used is simply latent risk waiting to be exploited. In addition, these unused access rules bloat a firewall policy, causing confusion and mistakes.

This type of issue is particularly difficult to deal with as unused access is not technically incorrect, and static analysis of a policy will not reveal the problem without tremendous environmental knowledge. Even when a firewall policy that was perfectly defined is not changed for a year, the problem of unused access probably exists, as the network and systems the firewall is protecting have likely changed in that time. To identify this situation, it is necessary to analyze the active policy against the actual network traffic patterns.

Log analysis against a defined policy should absolutely be automated. In an enterprise firewall, it is common to have millions of logs generated every day. Any attempt to do manual review of this information will simply be ineffective at best and likely cause significant business disruption.

Automation of this process is not trivial, however. The most common and visible identifier in both the policy and the logs is the rule number. However, attempting to use the rule number as a key for matching logs against a policy to determine usage can be error prone, as rule numbers typically change when rules are inserted and deleted. For this reason, matching should be done using a unique identifier whenever possible; otherwise, matching should always be performed with the policy corresponding to when the log was generated. Performing this analysis over a sufficiently long period of time (three to six months typically) enables a definitive determination of which rules are used and which are unused.

A note of caution when evaluating rule usage: some rules, such as disaster recovery rules, will be expected to have no usage for long periods of time. Care should still be taken prior to removing any rules based solely on usage. In addition, short evaluation periods (30 days or less) may not provide sufficient history to make a determination. Seasonal behavior or even vacation schedules may cause behavioral anomalies that will not be apparent over short analysis periods.

In addition to the analysis of rule usage, it is also possible to evaluate the inner-rule usage of network and service objects. A single rule with 10 source objects, 10 destination objects and 10 service objects logically permits 1,000 different access rules. By analyzing the usage of these individual objects inside of the rule, it is possible to identify a number of unnecessary access rules. For example, if only two of the 10 service objects are necessary, it is possible to reduce the logical rules from 1,000 to 200. This can have a tremendous impact on improving security.

Matching object usage requires significant processing effort. Use of an automated tool designed for this purpose is strongly recommended when attempting to clean up unused objects.

REVIEW RULES AND REFINE ACCESS

Rule review is an absolute necessity to ensure the firewall policy is effectively controlling access. Removing mistakes is a great first step. Removing unused access is a great next step. However, the simple determination that a rule is used does not mean it is necessary. A review of the business need and an acceptance of risk are necessary to fully justify the necessity of any remaining rule. Rule review is a complicated effort, and one that should be undertaken. However, that topic is beyond the scope of this paper, as it addresses a larger business decision and the process of justifying risk.

Significant improvements can be made to the firewall policy in a technical rule-review process. In particular, refining broad access rules to include only necessary access is an improvement. This type of analysis will apply to any broad access rule, but is most commonly associated with rules where "ANY" is defined. Generally these rules are created with excessive access due to poorly defined business requirements. For example, access to a server is requested, but it is not known what protocol or port is used in that access. As a result, a service of "ANY" is defined. Refining that access from "ANY" to a narrowly defined list of services will greatly enhance the security of the protected networks.

The correct way to solve this problem is through business analysis to identify what is justified and necessary. But this can be extremely difficult to accomplish because necessity is not understood. One very effective way to solve this problem is to evaluate usage of the rule. Once it is understood what access is being used, it is possible to refine the broad access rule with a much more narrowly defined access rule.

Flow analysis is used to evaluate usage. A flow is a quadruple data record defining the source, destination, protocol and port of traffic flowing through the monitored rule. By building up a history of all the witnessed activity, it is possible to document what is necessary. Unfortunately, flow analysis is not easy to do manually, and it is not provided by firewall vendors. However, tools are available to assist with this process, and they should be investigated when attempting to perform this step of policy cleanup.

Benefits of a Proper Firewall Policy

There are many and significant benefits to cleaning up a firewall policy.


- Reducing firewall administration overhead has a direct impact on the bottom line. Efficiencies gained through proper automation will produce a positive ROI. FireMon commissioned an excellent research report on firewall management ROI as a way to reduce cost. Be sure to visit the FireMon website and download your copy of "Firewall Economics – Spire Security Research Report."
- An optimized firewall policy will significantly reduce CPU load and may actually extend the life of the firewall platform. Understanding how rules are processed inside the policy is a key aspect of efficient firewall operation.
- Equally important to understanding how rules are used is to identify rules that are not being used. The identity and removal of unused rules not only reduces policy complexity but also will increase the overall security posture of an organization and aid in compliance initiatives.
- While identifying unused rules is an important aspect of policy optimization, it is also important to gain an understanding of how the actual objects inside a rule are being used (or not used). Removing unused objects not only helps reduce policy complexity but will also benefit the security posture of the firewall policy.
- Reduction in policy complexity through better firewall policy optimization will decrease the probability of and susceptibility to human error when making policy and configuration changes.
- The reduction of policy complexity will make firewall troubleshooting easier and accelerate restoration times, thus minimizing service impact during times of outages.

- Identifying overly permissive rules that allow greater access than the business requires can significantly increase the overall corporate security posture and provide better support for compliance initiatives.
- Alongside policy optimization comes good rule documentation. Having a well-optimized policy that is also complemented by thorough, centralized rule documentation further enhances firewall management and compliance provisions.

FireMon Security Manager - the Right Tool for the Job

The cleanup and optimization of a firewall policy can be a daunting challenge weighted by different variables. What is the size of the rulebase? How well has it been managed over time? Is there available rule documentation to aid in remediation of unused rules? FireMon created Security Manager to help address these very challenges. If you've been tasked with optimizing your company's firewalls, Security Manager can help. Moreover, once you've invested the time and energy to achieve the optimization of firewall policies, FireMon can help you keep it that way.

FireMon provides a full suite of utilities designed specifically to aid in the cleanup, optimization and ongoing maintenance of a firewall rulebase.



More than just a cleanup tool, Security Manager is a real-time security management and event monitoring solution for firewalls, switches, routers and load-balancer devices. Security Manager monitors for changes to policies and configurations, automatically compares a new policy to the previous policy and reports the difference (Who, What, When and Where). In addition, when the new policy is stored on the Security Manager server, it can perform an automatic, real-time audit against corporate requirements and report on it. Security Manager can readily achieve continual compliance monitoring – not just monitoring once or twice a year!

Security Manager's "Policy Test" lets you virtually verify current firewall policy connectivity or analyze results of a proposed "what if" data model.

Remove Technical Mistakes with Hidden Rules Report

Security Manager provides a standard report for identifying redundant and shadowed rules with the exact details that indicate the portion of the rule causing the redundancy. This automated analysis can be run immediately after FireMon is installed and configured on the network. Within minutes of deploying Security Manager, you can have a prioritized list of actions to begin cleaning up a firewall policy.

Using automated and detailed analysis, Security Manager provides accurate reports of hidden rules in the policy. These results are actionable; prioritized remediation steps with the lowest risk and the highest impact are identified at the top of the report.

Remove Unused Access with Usage Analysis

Title: Hidden Rules Report
Summary:
Format: Web Page (*.html)
Target: netscreen104
 IOS for Usage Test
 LycosCMA
 netscreen104
 Netke148
 NSM Server: 192.168.20.92

Detail Level

- Maximum:** includes all of the details in High plus partial overlaps, but does not recommend steps to resolution. **Caution:** This report may take an extremely long time to complete.
- High:** includes all of the details in Medium plus objects in a rule that are made redundant by a higher rule.
- Medium:** includes all of the details in Low plus rules made redundant by a lower rule.
- Low:** includes completely hidden rules.

Include object details (IP address, port, group members, etc)
 Collapse group members initially

Hidden Rules Report
 Device: netscreen104 (192.168.20.104)

Policy Overview

Policy Name	Hidden rules	Rules with redundant objects
From: Untrust To: Trust	2	0
From: Trust To: Untrust	29	0
From: Untrust To: Untrust	1	0
From: Trust To: Trust	0	0
From: Global To: Global	0	0

Policy: From: Untrust To: Trust
 Rule 4 (Allow SMTP) makes rule 6 redundant.
 Recommended action: Delete rule 6

Rule	Name	Source	Destination
4	Allow SMTP	Any	SPPHones (192.168.21.0 255.255.255.0)
6		192.168.19.0/255.255.255.0	SPPHones (192.168.21.0 255.255.255.0)

Identifying unused access in a policy is impossible by static review alone. Identifying actual usage on the network requires historical or real-time log analysis. Using an innovative and unique matching analysis, Security Manager is able to perform real-time analysis and provide an unlimited history for rule and object usage in a policy. As a result, you can perform usage analysis to identify unused and most used rules and objects in all policies. This actionable information permits quick remediation of unused access.

RULE USAGE ANALYSIS

Using real-time log monitoring, Security Manager provides graphical "Rule Usage" reporting that automatically identifies how rules and objects are being used so you can easily determine what changes need to be made to reduce policy complexity. In addition, Security Manager provides the data necessary to optimize the policy.

UNUSED RULE ANALYSIS

Security Manager clearly identifies which rules have seen no activity at all to help chart a remediation path for the removal of unused rules. This further aids the reduction of policy complexity while improving the corporate security posture.

UNUSED OBJECT ANALYSIS

Firewall vendors handle network and service objects differently. Some provide a robust editor for placing many objects in a rule, and others rely on group objects to represent a single identity. Some vendors require that objects have a saved definition before being placed in a rule, while others allow standard network and service definition directly in the rule. Regardless of the management approach, oftentimes network and service objects become stagnant inside of a rule, which adds inefficiencies to the security policy.

Display of Rule Order by Most Used

Number	Count	Percentage	Name	Logging	Co
74	46,252,455	27.27%		Log	
11	42,879,181	25.26%		Log	
124	17,705,987	10.34%		Log	
85	9,963,236	5.93%		Log	
7	8,294,627	5.02%		Log	
19	4,634,810	2.73%		Log	
41	4,082,211	2.44%		Log	
26	2,629,841	1.60%		Log	
86	1,981,762	1.19%		Log	
55	1,440,610	0.85%		Log	
50	1,075,520	0.63%		Log	
103	882,569	0.52%		Log	
55	883,174	0.51%		Log	

Display of Unused Rules

Log information for this policy

Rules: 325
 Unused rules: 26
 Rules with logging disabled: 0
 Most used security rules:

Rule 74: 27.27%
 Rule 11: 25.26%
 Rule 124: 10.34%
 Rule 85: 5.93%
 Rule 7: 5.02%
 Rule 19: 2.73%
 Rule 41: 2.44%
 Rule 26: 1.60%
 Rule 86: 1.19%
 Rule 55: 0.85%
 Rule 50: 0.63%
 Rule 103: 0.52%
 Rule 55: 0.51%

Objects inside of security rules that serve no purpose potentially allow unwanted access to resources. Security Manager's Rule Usage Analysis Report shows the hit count of security rules and the objects inside the rules. In addition, the report has a dedicated section for "Rules with Unused Objects," giving administrators the data necessary to reduce the scope of rules that are in use.

Sometimes objects are not hidden inside any rule or policy on the firewall. In those cases, Security Manager's global Object Usage Report details the usage of network and service objects regardless of their position in a policy.

Review Rules and Refine Access

Object Usage Report

Executive Summary
This report provides object usage information on the device: YahooCMA4 for the time period of 08 May 2010 00:00:00 CDT to 07 Jun 2010 22:56:38 CDT.

Object Usage Report

Object Usage Summary

Network Object Usage		Service Usage Summary	
Total	3316	Total	504
Used Network Objects	0	Used Services	5
Unused Network Objects	3311	Unused Services	499

Network Objects

- SplitCluster [192.168.20.210] 54,708
- SPInternalNetworks 43,430
- mxubuild [192.168.20.150] (p 150) 43,430
- Split-NCK-FW-2 [192.168.20.211] 29,909
- Split-NCK-FW-1 [192.168.20.212] 24,798
- Any [0.0.0.0] (A special global object defined by Check Point) N/A
- LocalMachine (Check Point Local Machine (Dynamic Interfaces)) 0
- LocalMachine_AllInterfaces (Check Point Local Machine (All Interfaces)) 0

Executive Usage Summary

Specific Object Hit Counts

OVERLY PERMISSIVE RULES AND USE OF "ANY"

Security Manager includes a "Traffic Flow Analysis" feature that shows unique traffic patterns that exist in a rule and clearly reports on what data is flowing across a broadly defined address range. This analysis also shows what traffic is flowing across the use of "ANY" in a source, destination or service field.

With the output from this report, it is possible to refine an existing rule and replace the broadly defined access with a more correct and narrowly defined rule.

A WORD ABOUT RULE DOCUMENTATION

Policy cleanup is a very important project, but a good firewall management strategy also includes a solid rule review process based on business justification. Security Manager provides the ability to automatically document device policies stored in the policy repository for that device. Rule documentation is the meta-data that explains a rule. Both automated and manual entry methods exist for the rule meta-data as values for specified attributes. The meta-data is uniquely associated with the rule for its lifetime, so when the policy or rule is modified, the meta-data is not subject to modified rule numbers or other transient data changes.

Rule documentation can support your most important firewall administration tasks. For example, rule documentation is critical for certain regulatory compliance standards. Rules that don't meet a particular standard's specifications must be justified. Security Manager's rule documentation features can act as the centralized repository for that justification.

Rule documentation includes the following attributes:

- Owner
- Business Unit
- Created on
- Expires on
- Justification

Firewall Traffic Flow Analysis Report

Policy: From: Trust To: Untrust

Rule	Name	Source	Destination	Service	Action	Log	Comments
1		SP-internal	Any	ANY	Accept		

Report Range: 01 Jul 2009 11:05:37 CDT to 08 Jul 2009 11:05:37 CDT

Report Sections

Flow
Flow analysis has identified 708 FLOWS through this security rule and has grouped them into 482 TRAFFIC PATTERNS.

No.	Count	Source	Destination	Service
1	89 (0.118%)	192.168.20.16/28 (99)	255.255.255.127 (99)	hepopt (57) tcp / 3158 (6) udp / 53 (4) udp / 369 (1) udp / 5436 (3) udp / 7894 (3) udp / 12856 (7) udp / 31103 (1) udp / 34354 (2)

Analyze Use of "ANY"

Flow Analysis of Traffic

AUDIT CHANGE LOG

Security Manager's Audit Change Log feature captures and records the detail of every change event in the context of the firewall policy.

It appears in the GUI as a collection of incremental policy comparisons at the rule, object and policy levels that is updated in real time as revisions are retrieved. This provides the ability to produce detailed reports on the life history of rule and object changes in context of a policy.

Additional Recommended Reading

What to learn more? Visit our resource page, where you can find additional articles of interest:

URL: <http://www.firemon.com/company/resources.aspx>

- ***Performance Impacts of Complexity***
Presentation on the impacts of policy size and rule order on firewall performance
- ***Firewall Economics – Spire Security Research Report***
This paper highlights the challenges of firewall administration and discusses the economic opportunities associated with automation
- ***Survey Report on Firewall Complexity***
FireMon survey report on firewall policy management